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COMMENTS
Social Host Liability on Campus: Taking
the "High" Out of Higher Education
Although the consumption of alcoholic beverages by per-
sons under 21 years of age is proscribed by law . . . , the use
of alcohol by college students is not so unusual or heinous by
contemporary standards as to require special efforts by college
administrators to stamp it out.'
As the above excerpt indicates, alcohol consumption by college
and university students has, until recently, been widely accepted as
an inexorable phenomenon of higher education. For many years, col-
lege student life has been intimately associated with drinking.2 Re-
cent statistics indicate that this association has continued.3 Yet,
while the popularity of such activity may be immutable, societal atti-
tudes have not been so unyielding. An ever-increasing awareness of
the problems associated with alcohol consumption has resulted in
less tolerant policies toward student drinking.4 Organizations such as
BACCHUS 5 and Students Against Drunk Driving have been formed
I. Baldwin v. Zoradi, 123 Cal. App. 3d 275, 288, - P.2d . . 176 Cal. Rptr.
809, 817 (1981).
2. Buchanan, Alcohol on Campus and Possible Liability, 21 NAT'L ASS'N STUDENT
PERSONNEL ADMIN. J. 2 (1983). The author concludes that colleges and universities can no
longer rely on the indulgence of understanding judges to protect them from the "Animal
House" mind set. Id. at 3.
3. See Ingalls, Higher Education's Drinking Problem, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 21,
1982 at 1, 7 [hereinafter Drinking Problem].
4. Id. at I. See W. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 58-61 (2d ed. 1985);
Buchanan, supra note 2, at 3; Janosik, Liquor Law Liability on the College Campus: When
Are We Responsible?, 21 NAT'L ASS'N STUDENT PERSONNEL ADMIN. J. 21 (1983); Roth, The
Impact of Liquor Law Liability on Colleges and Universities, 13 J.C. & U.L. 45 (1986); In-
galls, Colleges in Growing Danger from Drinking-Related Lawsuits, Experts Say, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 27, 1985 at II [hereinafter Growing Danger]; Wolfe, Colleges are Tak-
ing New Steps to Reduce Drinking on Campus, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Fiske,
Colleges Press Alcohol Curbs as States Raise Drinking Age, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1983, at 1,
col. 3.
5. Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at I, 6. BACCHUS is an acronym for the group's
rarely used full name: "Boost Alcohol Consciousness Concerning the Health of University Stu-
dents." The organization, which was founded at the University of Florida in 1976, has chap-
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with a view toward reducing or eliminating alcohol-related problems
among student bodies.' Many administrations have reassessed alco-
hol policies and have adopted provisions reflecting the recent concern
with student drinking.7 Over half of all colleges and universities now
prohibit drinking on campus.8
In addition to expressing heightened sensitivity towards alcohol-
related problems among their students, college and university admin-
istrators have voiced growing concern over institutional alcohol-re-
lated tort liability.9 Historically, colleges and universities have en-
joyed virtual immunity from alcohol-related claims.'" Recent
decisions," however, suggest that the ever-expanding scope of social
host liability will reach college and university campuses in the near
future.' 2 Thus, for many schools and their students, the party may
soon be over.
This Comment addresses the likelihood of the imposition of so-
cial host liability on colleges and universities in the future. In Part I,
the magnitude of alcohol consumption, abuse, and alcohol-related
problems that exist on campuses is explored. Additionally, the ad-
ministrative responses to these problems are examined. Part II dis-
cusses the basis for social host liability and the likelihood that col-
leges and universities will face exposure to such liability. Part III
involves an assessment of the burden that social host liability is
ters on campuses throughout the nation. While accepting the premise that young people will
indulge in drinking, the BACCHUS organization encourages moderation in the use of alcohol
among students who drink, and respect for the choice of students who abstain. The
BACCHUS program is frequently cited for its visibility and success in promoting responsible
drinking. Id.
6. Roth, supra note 4, at 45; Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at 1, 6.
7. Ingalls, Higher Drinking Age Won't Solve Problems of Alcohol Abuse by Students,
Officials Say, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 30, 1985, at 23, 24 [hereinafter Higher Drinking
Age]. The trend toward a higher drinking age has led top officials on campuses across the
nation to adopt comprehensive, schoolwide policies on alcohol. Within the last few years,
nearly two-thirds of colleges and universities nationwide have reviewed their alcohol policies.
Experts say that the policies are needed to prevent alcohol abuse and to protect the schools
from legal liability involving drunk students. Id. As an example, the University of Connecticut
revised its alcohol policy to prohibit drinking in the public area of dormitories. Columbia Uni-
versity, New York University, and the University of Rhode Island have new policies requiring
prior registration of events where alcohol will be served. The University of California at Berke-
ley has barred the use of student fees for the purchase of alcohol. See Fiske, supra note 4, at
C7, col. 2.
8. Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at 1, 7. According to the survey published therein,
53% of schools prohibit the consumption of alcoholic beverages on campus. Id.
9. See Higher Drinking Age, supra note 7, at 23, 24; Growing Danger, supra note 4, at
11; Fiske, supra note 4, at 1, col. 3.
10. See Gregory, Alcohol Consumption by College Students and Related Liability Is-
sues, 14 J.L. & Eouc. 43, 44 (1985); Growing Danger, supra note 4, at 1I.
11. See infra notes 152-78 and accompanying text.
12. See infrd notes 68-129 and accompanying text; notes 146-95 and accompanying text.
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likely to impose upon colleges and universities, and concludes that
these problems ought to be handled by state legislatures. Part IV
provides suggestions that administrative officials may want to con-
sider in seeking to reduce the potential for institutional liability.
I. An Overview: College Alcohol Problems and Responses
A. Drinking on Campus
"Drinking and college student life," it has been said, "are inex-
tricably connected." 1 Although many colleges and universities have
adopted measures designed to curb student drinking,14 statistics con-
tinue to demonstrate the virtual ineffectiveness of these policies in
reducing alcohol consumption among student populations. For exam-
ple, a 1982 survey concluded that seventy-five percent of all college
and university students drink alcohol. 15 The reported increase in the
number of students who drink excessively is paralleled by increasing
reports of hangovers, missed classes, and lower grades.1" A small,
but nevertheless significant, growth in the number of dropouts is at-
tributed to alcohol-related problems."
In addition to the rising consumption percentages and related
academic problems, the adverse health consequences associated with
alcohol abuse represent one of the most serious problems facing our
nation's campuses today.' 8 The age group encompassing the majority
of university students has a particularly high rate of alcohol-related
deaths."9 Among young adults between the ages of fifteen and
twenty-four, the top three causes of death are motor vehicle acci-
dents, suicides, and fatal assaults or homicides.20 Significantly, all
13. Buchanan, supra note 2, at 2.
14. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
15. See Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at 1, 6, 7. Research findings vary to a certain
extent. For example, a survey conducted in Florida concluded that approximately 88% of those
surveyed were consumers of alcohol. A 1978 study of thirty-four New England colleges yielded
an incredibly high figure of 95%. Most experts seem to place the figure between 70 and 90%.
See id.
16. Id. at 7. Approximately 36% of the survey schools reported an increase in excessive
drinking. Such increases were particularly high among public institutions in the Northeast,
more than half of which reported greater frequency of excessive drinking. Additionally, 21% of
the schools reported increases in the number of students who had experienced bad hangovers.
Moreover, 22.1% noted a greater frequency in missed classes attributable to alcohol. Finally,
almost one-fourth reported increases in the number of students whose grades had suffered
because of alcohol. Id.
17. Id.
18. Roth, supra note 4, at 45. See Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at 1, 6, 7.
19. Roth, supra note 4, at 46.
20. Id. These three causes account for 78% of the deaths among this age group.
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three causes are closely associated with alcohol use and abuse.2
Moreover, no less than ninety percent of fraternity and sorority haz-
ing deaths have involved the consumption of alcohol."
College and university administrators report similar trends in
alcohol-related law enforcement problems. The percentage of vandal-
ism and fighting attributable to alcohol has risen dramatically in re-
cent years.23 Additionally, more frequent reports of drunk driving
24
and alcohol-related gang rapes have been causing widespread con-
cern.2 As the statistics reveal, the ill effects arising from alcohol
consumption are not confined solely to those who drink.
B. Institutional Responses: Cracking Down on Drinking?
Many college and university administrations, aware of the vast
potential of liability associated with such ominous statistics, have in-
stituted new and more stringent policies regarding the consumption
of alcohol on campus.2  An increasing number of schools are requir-
ing fraternities and sororities to conduct rush on a "dry," i.e., no
alcohol allowed, basis.27 College and university curricula are more
frequently offering courses and programs designed to educate stu-
dents about alcohol use and abuse.28 At some institutions, such
courses are mandatory.29
In spite of the increasing concern over student drinking and al-
cohol-related tort liability, a substantial percentage of schools con-
tinue to allow alcoholic beverages to be sold, served, and consumed
on campus.30 More than half of all private liberal-arts colleges per-
mit the consumption of alcoholic beverages in university housing.3"
Moreover, one-fourth of all colleges allow beer, which is the drink of
choice among students, 2 to be sold on campus.3" Even among those
21. Id.
22. Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at 1.
23. More than one-fourth (26.5%) of the survey schools reported increased incidents of
fighting. Moreover, 29% of the schools reported greater frequency of alcohol-related vandal-
ism. Id. Some schools report that as much as 80% of their vandalism is attributable to student
drinking. Wolfe, supra note 4, at B7, col. 3.
24. Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at 7.
25. Roth, supra note 4, at 47.
26. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
27. Fiske, supra note 4, at I, col. 3. See Roth, supra note 4, at 62.
28. See Roth, supra note 4, at 58.
29. For example, at Kent State University, some students who are disciplined for alco-
hol-related offenses must take a one-credit course entitled "The Drug Alcohol." Fiske, supra
note 4, at 1, col. 3.
30. Roth, supra note 4, at 48; Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at 1, 6, 7.
31. Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at 7.
32. See Buchanan, supra note 2, at 3; Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at I, 6, 7.
33. Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at 7.
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schools that have instituted policies designed to curb on-campus
drinking, there is a sense of helplessness among officials who attempt
to enforce these restrictions. 4 Yet, whether a school adopts more
restrictive alcohol policies may have little effect on potential liability.
As recent case law indicates, schools that have adopted more strin-
gent alcohol policies, as well as those which have not, are vulnerable
to social host liability.
3 5
II. Social Host Liability: Theoretical Bases"6 and Their Application
to Institutions of Higher Learning
Historically, most efforts designed to impose liability on furnish-
ers of alcohol have been directed against tavernkeepers3 7 Increas-
ingly, however, attempts have been made to hold social hosts ac-
countable for the intoxication of their guests.3 8 Social hosts may be
broadly defined as noncommercial suppliers of intoxicating bever-
ages. 9 As such, private homeowners entertaining friends, as well as
fraternities and employers hosting holiday parties, have been held to
fall within the legal definition. "' The expansive nature of this defini-
34. At Brown University, where one-half of the underaged students continue to drink,
administrators have concluded that the state law governing alcohol consumption is virtually
unenforceable. Part of the problem is that the underage students are able to find older friends
to purchase alcohol for them. Fiske, supra note 4, at C7, col. 1, 2. Another facet of the prob-
lem is that many students see drinking as a right, and are not willing to adhere to a law with
which they disagree. Wolfe, supra note 4, at B7, col. 1. Interestingly, while the national trend
to raise the minimum drinking age to twenty-one has caused large numbers of institutions to
adopt comprehensive alcohol policies, a higher drinking age alone is unlikely to solve the prob-
lem. Indeed, many experts believe that a higher drinking age merely causes students to alter
their drinking habits. A higher drinking age seems to force alcohol consumption underground.
Moreover, some administrators predict that students will resort to "front-end loading," i.e.,
getting drunk before on-campus events at which they may have difficulty obtaining alcohol.
Additionally, many legal experts believe that a drinking age of twenty-one places colleges and
universities at a greater risk of alcohol-related liability. Higher Drinking Age, supra note 7, at
23, 24. This conclusion is based upon the fact that a drinking age of twenty-one means that
approximately three-quarters of a typical student population will be minors. Growing Danger,
supra note 7, at 11. Administrators concede that effective enforcement of the law against 75%
of their students may be unrealistic. See Wolfe, supra note 4, at 1, col. 1.
35. See infra notes 194-204 and accompanying text.
36. Courts have consistently refused to predicate social host liability on violation of
Dram Shop Acts. Special Project, Social Host Liability for the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated
Guests, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1058, 1076 (1985). Therefore, this Comment will focus upon the
more frequently recognized bases of social host liability.
37. Comment, Third Party Liability for Drunken Driving: When "One for the Road"
Becomes One for the Courts, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1143 (1983-84).
38. See generally Special Project, supra note 36, at 1058-1141; Comment, supra note
37, at 1119-92.
39. Comment, supra note 37, at 1143.
40. Id.; see e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (private home-
owners entertaining a guest); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity,
258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971) (college fraternity hosting party off campus); Congini v.
Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983) (employer as host of Christmas
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tion has also resulted in individuals being characterized as social
hosts despite the fact that they did not directly serve alcohol to the
intoxicated individual. 1
A. Traditional Principles of Common Law Negligence as a Basis
for Social Host Liability
1. Preliminary Considerations.-At common law, the fur-
nisher of intoxicating liquors was not liable for harm caused by an
inebriated person . 2 The common law rule held that the voluntary
consumption of intoxicating beverages by an able-bodied man was
the proximate or legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries.'" Thus, the
principle of intervening causes protected social hosts from liability,
even in the event that the furnisher of alcohol was found to have
acted negligently."
A select number of courts have abrogated the traditional com-
mon law rule by imposing liability on social hosts for injuries suf-
fered by third persons as a result of the intoxicated guest's negli-
gence." These courts, by applying principles of ordinary negligence,
have emphasized the foreseeability of the events leading to a third
party's injuries. 6 While acknowledging that a host is generally not
liable for injuries to third persons resulting from a guest's intoxica-
party). For more on Congini, see infra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Macleary v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that a host may
be found liable if deliberately creating an atmosphere that is conducive to the consumption of
alcohol by minors). For more on the Macleary decision, see infra notes 170-78 and accompa-
nying text.
42. Roth, supra note 4, at 48; Special Project, supra note 36, at 1086; Comment, supra
note 37, at 1143.
The Maryland Supreme Court has provided a lucid statement of the common law
position:
[Tihe common law knows no right of action against a seller of intoxicating
liquors, as such, for "causing" intoxication of the person whose negligent or will-
ful wrong has caused injury. Human beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for
their own torts, The law (apart from statute) recognizes no relation of proximate
cause between a sale of liquor and a tort committed by a buyer who has drunk
the liquor.
State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 254, 78 A.2d 754, 756 (1951).
43. Roth, supra note 4, at 48; Special Project, supra note 36, at 1063; Comment, supra
note 37, at 1143.
44. Special Project, supra note 36, at 1086.
45. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr.
534 (1978); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); Wiener v. Gamma Phi
Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971). But cf. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1714(b) (West 1985) (expressly abrogating the holding in Coulter in favor of the
common law rule).
46. Special Project, supra note 36, at 1091. See also Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.
3d at 152-53, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (stating that service of alcoholic bever-
ages to an obviously intoxicated person by one who knows that the intoxicated person intends
to drive a motor vehicle creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury).
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tion, these courts reject the view that serving intoxicating beverages
never gives rise to a duty to deny a guest further access to alcohol.
7
In most instances, this duty is held to arise only when social hosts
serve minors or obviously intoxicated individuals. 8 Courts in these
instances display a penchant for noting that the consumption of alco-
hol resulting in intoxication creates a foreseeable risk of harm, espe-
cially if the host knows or has reason to know that the guest will be
driving.
4 9
Contrary to these decisions, courts in many states still adhere to
the common law rule that the furnishing of alcohol is not the legal or
proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries. 50 Several factors have been
highlighted as contributing to the judicial hesitancy in applying ordi-
nary negligence principles to a social host. Social hosts, unlike com-
mercial vendors, have no pecuniary motives in providing alcohol to
their guests. Moreover, some courts have refused to extend such lia-
bility absent legislative approval."' Finally, the difficulty in monitor-
ing a guest's level of intoxication may also support the continued
distinction between hosts and tavernkeepers.
2. Decisions Bearing on Colleges and Universities: Social
Host Liability Based Upon Ordinary Principles of Negligence.-As
illustrated above, even in the most inviting circumstances, courts are
47. See, e.g., Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or.
632, -, 485 P.2d 18, 21 (1971) (rejecting rule that furnishing alcohol to others in a social
setting, even if the host acts unreasonably, can never give rise to liability for acts of the guest
whose intoxication results). See also Campbell v. Board of Trustees, 495 N.E.2d 227, 232
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that there may be situations where a college or university will be
required to control a drunk driver in order to avert liability for injuries sustained by another).
For more on Campbell, see infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Wiener, 258 Or. at -, 485 P.2d at 21. The court declares that the duty
to deny a guest further access to alcohol arises when the host has reason to know that he is
dealing with a person whose characteristics make it especially likely that he or she will per-
form unreasonable acts. According to the court, such a person could include one already se-
verely intoxicated, or one whose behavior the host knows to be unusually affected by alcohol.
See also Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 556, 476 A.2d 1219, 1228 (1984) (extending social
host liability for the service of alcohol to visibly intoxicated guest).
49. See, e.g., Coulter, 21 Cal. 3d at 144, 577 P.2d at 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 534 (1978)
(recognizing common law cause of action where host served obviously intoxicated guest when
it was foreseeable that the guest would drive); Kelly, 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222 (court
asserts that the defendant host could have foreseen that the intoxicated guest would be incapa-
ble of driving safely if the defendant host continued to serve him alcohol); Wiener, 258 Or. at
- 485 P.2d at 23 (concluding that a jury might properly find that the defendant frater-
nity's behavior was unreasonable because it had served alcohol to a minor who it should have
known would be driving after the party).
50. Special Project, supra note 36, at 1085; Comment, supra note 37, at 1143.
51. Id. But cf. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 552-56, 476 A.2d at 1226-28 (rejecting argument that
the legislature is the only proper body to determine whether liability should be imposed on
social hosts).
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reluctant to extend the scope of social host liability.52 Moreover, with
regard to claims against colleges and universities, courts have been
even less willing to impose liability premised upon this doctrine."3
The differential treatment in actions against colleges or universities
can be attributed to the duty which the law imposes upon these
institutions.5"
Central to any cause of action for negligence is the existence of
a duty that is owed by the plaintiff to the defendant . 5 Generally, in
the absence of unusual circumstances, the duty is that which a rea-
sonable man would use under the circumstances. 6 When a college or
university is involved, however, the duty is significantly different.5 7
a. In Loco Parentis.-Prior to the 1960s, colleges and univer-
sities operated under the legal theory of in loco parentis.5 8 This the-
ory, which was first elaborated in Gott v. Berea College, involved
the notion that the school stood in the place of parents with regard
to supervision of the students' conduct and welfare.60 The in loco
parentis doctrine permitted the institution to exercise virtually un-
limited legal authority over, as well as responsibility for, the students
in their care.6
b. The Demise of In Loco Parentis: A New View.-The signif-
icant cultural and social changes of the 1960s saw an equally dra-
matic transition in the student-university relationship.62 A wide vari-
ety of factors combined to make the in loco parentis 'relationship less
tenable. The reduction in the age of majority, large increases in the
number of students seeking degrees, a more diverse student popula-
tion, and a relaxation of the traditional "lock-step" pattern of educa-
52. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 68-94 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
55. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984).
56. Id.
57. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
58. W. KAPLAN, supra note 4, at 4, 59; Gregory, supra note 10, at 43, 44; Jones, In
Loco Parentis Reborn: Whitlock v. University of Denver, 34 W. EDUC. L. REP. 995 (1986);
Roth, supra note 4, at 55, 56.
59. 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913). The court stated:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral
welfare and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why, to that
end, they may not make any rule or regulation for the government or betterment
of their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose.
Id. at -, 161 S.W. at 206.
60. See supra note 58.
61. Id.
62. For an excellent commentary on the changed role of college administration vis-a-vis
college students, see Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979).
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tional preparation, forced a judicial reassessment of the propriety of
the in loco parentis doctrine."s
The result of this re-evaluation was a complete reversal of ear-
lier views regarding the student-university relationship. Courts
across the nation were quick to note the demise of the in loco paren-
tis doctrine.6 4 Adding to the dissolution of this traditional view was
the Supreme Court's declaration in 1971 that students are adults.6 "
Subsequently, courts began proclaiming that colleges and universi-
ties were no longer insurers of the safety of their students.6 A deci-
sion from Ohio provides a classic statement of the new view of the
student-university relationship:
A university is an institution for the advancement of knowl-
edge and learning. It is neither a nursery school, a boarding
school nor a prison. No one is required to attend. Persons who
meet the required qualifications and who abide by the univer-
sity's rules and regulations are permitted to attend and must be
presumed to have sufficient maturity to conduct their own per-
sonal affairs."7
Although this view gave students the freedom which they cherished,
it also operated to preclude the imposition of institutional liability
for injuries sustained by students.
c. Case Law.-The landmark case in which a college or uni-
versity was sued as a social host based upon principles of ordinary
negligence is Bradshaw v. Rawlings.68 In Bradshaw, the plaintiff was
63. Gregory, supra note 10, at 43, 44; Jones, supra note 58, at 996; Roth, supra note 4,
at 55, 56. The traditional "lock-step" pattern of education led students directly from high
school to college to graduate work. See W. KAPLAN, supra note 4, at 5, 6.
64. Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979). The court stated:
[Elighteen year old students are now identified with an expansive bundle of
individual rights not held by college students from decades past ... [T]he
change has occurred because society considers the modern college student an
adult, not a child of tender years.
Id. at 139-40. Accord Baldwin v. Zoradi, 123 Cal. App. 3d 275, 287, - P.2d . .
176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 816 (1981); Campbell v. Board of Trustees, 495 N.E.2d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986); Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).
65. Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 197 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). "Students
...are adults who are members of the college or university community."
66. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138. Accord Baldwin v. Zoradi, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 287,
- P.2d at - , 176 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (quoting Bradshaw with approval); Campbell v.
Board of Trustees, 495 N.E.2d at 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Beach v. University of Utah, 726
P.2d at 417-20 (Utah 1986).
67. Hegel v. Langsam, 29 Ohio Misc. 147, -, 273 N.E.2d 351, 352 (1971).
68. 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979). For detailed discussions of the Bradshaw decision, see
Note, Torts - Negligent Supervision - College Liability - Student Intoxication Injury, 19
DuQ. L. REV. 381 (1981); Note, The Student-College Relationship and the Duty of Care.
Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 14 GA. L. REV. 843 (1980).
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severely injured while riding in a vehicle operated by a fellow stu-
dent.69 The two young men were returning from a sophomore class
picnic at which Rawlings, the driver, had been drinking beer.7"
While en route, Rawlings drove the car into a parked vehicle.7" The
collision caused Rawlings' car to overturn. Consequently, Bradshaw
suffered a cervical fracture that resulted in quadriplegic paralysis.72
Bradshaw brought suit against Rawlings and the college. In his
action against the school, Bradshaw asserted a claim under common
law negligence. 1 He contended that the school's negligent supervi-
sion of the picnic resulted in Rawlings' inebriation and, conse-
quently, the accident.74 Additionally, Bradshaw claimed that by fail-
ing to properly supervise the students, the college proximately caused
his injuries.
The evidence produced at trial established that the picnic was a
college-sponsored activity. A faculty member had participated in
planning the event.7 Moreover, the school administration had
printed flyers notifying the class of the date and place of the picnic.
The flyers also displayed drawings of beer mugs.76 Additionally, the
college had regulations that prohibited the consumption of alcoholic
beverages by any of its students at college-sponsored events.7
The court prefaced its discussion of Bradshaw's claim by noting
that, in contrast to the days when the doctrine of in loco parentis
governed, there was no longer a special duty running from the school
to its students.78 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff had the af-
firmative burden of establishing the existence of such a duty.79
In attempting to meet this burden, Bradshaw first argued that
the school regulations prohibiting the consumption of alcohol by stu-
dents provided evidence of a custodial relationship and, implicitly, a




73. Id. at 140, 141.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 137. The faculty member also co-signed a check used to purchase the beer. He
did not, however, attend the picnic, nor did he get another faculty member to attend in his
place. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Approximately seventy-five students attended the picnic and consumed six or
seven half-kegs of beer. The court also noted that the vast majority of students drinking at the
picnic were underage. Bradshaw testified that Rawlings had been drinking and another witness
expressed his opinion that Rawlings was inebriated when he left the picnic. Id.
78. Id. at 138-40. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
79. 612 F.2d at 141.
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duty.80 Responding to this argument, the court concluded that the
regulation, in and of itself, was insufficient to place the college in a
custodial relationship with its students for purposes of imposing a
duty of protection. "A college regulation that essentially tracks a
state law ...does not . . . indicate that the college voluntarily as-
sumed a custodial relationship with its students." 1
The court next considered whether a special relationship, 2 and
therefore a duty, existed between the parties as a matter of law.8" In
asserting his claim of a special relationship, Bradshaw contended
that since the college knew that its students would drink at the pic-
nic, it had knowledge of a probability of harm to third persons
which, in turn, imposed a duty on the college. This duty allegedly
took one of two forms: either controlling Rawlings' conduct, or pro-
tecting Bradshaw from possible harm. 84 Noting that the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court had previously refused to find a special relation-
ship between a private host and an injured third person, 5 the Third
Circuit opined that the state's high court would be especially unwill-
80. The school regulation stated:
Possession or consumption of alcohol or malt beverages on the property of
the College or at any College sponsored or related affair will result in discipli-
nary action. The same rule will apply to every student regardless of age.
Id.
81. Id. In asserting the existence of a custodial relationship between himself and the
school, Bradshaw apparently relied on § 320 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This sec-
tion states:
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of
another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal power of
self-protection or to subject him to association with persons likely to harm him,
is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of third
persons as to prevent them from intentionally harming the other or so con-
ducting themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the
conduct of the third persons, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exer-
cising such control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965).
82. By asserting the existence of a special relationship, Bradshaw attempted to come
within § 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 315 states the general rule regard-
ing special relationships:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent
him from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relationship exists between the actor and the third per-
son which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's
conduct, or
(b) a special relationship exists between the actor and the other
which gives to the other a right to protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
83. 612 F.2d at 141.
84. Id.
85. See Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1983).
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ing to find such a relationship between a school and its students.8"
The court emphasized the tremendous burden that would be placed
upon the institution if such a duty was recognized.87 The court there-
fore rejected Bradshaw's claim and reversed the lower court's
decision .88
The Bradshaw case has been accorded great precedential value
for many years. Thus, in Beach v. University of Utah,89 the Supreme
Court of Utah refused to find the defendant school liable as a social
host under ordinary negligence principles. In Beach, the plaintiff-stu-
dent was injured when she fell from a cliff while on a field trip spon-
sored by the university.90 She was intoxicated at the time of the acci-
dent. At trial, she contended that the university had breached its
affirmative duty to supervise and protect her.9
In addressing her appeal from the granting of the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the court relied heavily upon the
Bradshaw decision, concluding that a realistic assessment of the re-
lationship between the parties precluded a finding of the existence of
a special relationship. 92 In response to the plaintiff's argument that
the school regulations created such a relationship, the court declared
that while "the behavior code established by the University may per-
mit discipline of students for infractions, it certainly does not change
the nature of their relationship. "98 The court further explained that
since Utah law did not provide a remedy for one injured as a result
of his or her voluntary intoxication, the question of whether the Uni-
versity had provided the alcohol was immaterial. '
Although a similar result was achieved in Campbell v. Board of
Trustees,95 the Indiana Court of Appeals significantly limited the
breadth of the Bradshaw rationale. In Campbell, a female student
86. 612 F.2d at 141.
87. Id.
88. The lower court held that liability would extend only to those who had actually
handed alcohol to the minors. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 464 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
89. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).
90. Id. at 415.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 419. The court stated that
[lit would be unrealistic to impose upon an institution of higher education
the additional role of custodian over its adult students and to charge it with
responsibility for preventing students from illegally consuming alcohol and,
should they do so, with responsibility for assuring their safety and the safety of
others.
Id.
93. Id. at 420.
94. Id. at 417 n.3.
95. 495 N.E.2d 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
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from St. Mary's College spent an evening with Heslin, a male stu-
dent at Wabash College.96 During the evening, the two consumed
alcoholic beverages which Heslin had purchased and provided.9
While returning to St. Mary's campus early the following morning,
Heslin, who was intoxicated, drove into a ditch. Campbell suffered
serious injuries as a result.9"
Campbell claimed that the college had a duty to control Hes-
lin's consumption of alcoholic beverages as a matter of law. 99 Al-
though the court refused to impose a duty on the college to control
Heslin's drinking,100 the court was of the opinion that "there may be
situations where a college or university will be required to control a
drunk driver in order to avert liability for injuries sustained by an-
other." '' Even more significantly, the court listed several reasons
why the situation involved in Campbell did not require the college to
control Heslin's drinking: "No evidence suggests that . . . the Col-
lege . . . provided Heslin with alcoholic beverages, that the college
. . . knew that Heslin ever drank alcoholic beverages or that he
would be drinking that particular night, or that the college . . .
knew that Heslin would drive an automobile after becoming intoxi-
cated."' 0  By inference, the existence of any of these factors may
have prompted a different result in Campbell.
One case in which a plaintiff was successful in imposing liability
upon an educational institution is Zavala v. Regents of University of
California.08 In that case Zavala, a twenty-three-year-old nonstu-
dent, was injured on the campus of the University of California at
Santa Cruz. 04 Zavala had attended a party sponsored by staff mem-
bers of a residence hall. In addition to drinking beer from a keg that
was provided by the staff members, Zavala smoked marijuana and
consumed nearly a pint of brandy which he brought to the party.'
The court found that Zavala's voluntary intoxication created a
situation of "willful misconduct" which, in turn, led to his acci-
96. Id. at 228.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 229.
99. Id.
100. The court found that "Campbell's theory of third party liability, i.e. that the Col-
lege and Fraternity are liable for their failure to control Heslin's drinking activity, does not fit
neatly" into any special relationship categories expounded in § 315 of the Second Restatement
of Torts. Id. at 232.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 125 Cal. App. 3d 646, - P.2d - , 178 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1981).
104. 125 Cal. App. 3d at 648, - P.2d -, 178 Cal. Rptr. 186.
105. Id.
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dent.106 Yet, under California's comparative negligence doctrine, the
jury was able to find the University twenty percent liable for the
injury, since it had been negligent in continuing to serve alcoholic
beverages to an obviously intoxicated person.1"7 The appellate court
affirmed the verdict, reasoning that a person's willful misconduct
does not completely absolve a defendant who is negligent in his own
right. 10 8
In direct contrast to the Bradshaw rationale, the Colorado
Court of Appeals' decision in Whitlock v. University of Denver"0 9
may signal the return to an in loco parentis relationship between
students and universities.' 0 Although the case did not involve an al-
cohol-related injury, the decision is germane to the extent that it
rests upon evidence of a known danger."' In Whitlock, the plaintiff-
student suffered injuries in a trampoline accident that rendered him
a quadriplegic." 2 At trial, the jury found the university seventy-two
percent responsible for Whitlock's injuries and awarded him more
than five million dollars." 3
In upholding the jury's verdict, the court of appeals found that
the university owed a duty to Whitlock which required either remov-
ing the trampoline from the fraternity or supervising its use."" The
court's conclusion was based upon the following factors: 1) the fra-
ternity house and trampoline stood on land leased by the university;
2) university personnel were aware of the dangers associated with
the use of a trampoline; and 3) the university had previously exer-
cised a degree of control over student activities in campus fraterni-
ties."15 Although the majority decision states that "as tried, in loco
parentis was not an issue in this case,""' the court's imposition of a
duty necessarily involves contemplation of the in loco parentis
doctrine." 7
106. 125 Cal. App. 3d at 649, - P.2d at -, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
107. 125 Cal. App. 3d at 649, __ P.2d at -, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
108. 125 Cal. App. 3d at 650, - P.2d at -, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 187. Apparently,
the school did not raise the issue of whether it owed a duty to the plaintiff.
109. 712 P.2d 1072 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
110. See Jones, supra note 58, at 995-99.
111. See 712 P.2d at 1075.
112. 712 P.2d at 1074. See Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515
(1983) (suggesting that alcohol consumption by a minor is a known danger).
113. 712 P.2d at 1074.
114. Id. at 1075.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1077.
117. See Jones, supra note 60, at 995-99. See also Growing Danger, supra note 4, at 1 I
(noting that if affirmed on appeal, Whitlock could have profound implications for all colleges,
especially in alcohol-related lawsuits).
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As these decisions illustrate, there is a fine line distinguishing
those cases in which a school is absolved of social host liability from
those in which a school will be held liable under traditional princi-
ples of negligence. While it has been held that colleges and universi-
ties are no longer insurers of their students' safety,118 it is nonethe-
less true that courts are more frequently distinguishing the
Bradshaw rationale.119 Thus in Campbell, the court strongly sug-
gested that had the college served the alcohol, or had it known of the
defendant's intoxication, an affirmative duty of control would have
arisen.1 20 This same distinction is apparent in Zavala, in which lia-
bility was predicated on the fact that university representatives
served beer to an obviously intoxicated individual. 1 Similarly,
under the Whitlock court's rationale, a school's awareness of a
known danger, such as alcohol consumption by a minor or obviously
intoxicated individual, 122 would suffice to trigger an affirmative
duty.1
28
Currently, the demise of the in loco parentis doctrine continues
to protect colleges and universities from assuming the role of insurer
in social host liability cases based on ordinary principles of negli-
gence. 2" Liability in such cases is contingent upon the court finding
that a special relationship exists whereby the school has the duty to
control the student's conduct. 25 As the Bradshaw and Beach deci-
sions demonstrate, there is no such general duty imposed on the
school." 6 Yet, this insulation from liability is limited. As the Zavala
and Campbell decisions suggest, schools should refrain from provid-
ing alcohol to their students, 27 and prohibit the use of school funds
for the purchase of alcohol. 128 Moreover, as the Whitlock and Camp-
bell decisions indicate, once a school has knowledge of a potentially
hazardous situation involving alcohol, it may be under an affirmative
118. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983)
(suggesting that alcohol consumption by a minor is a known danger which the Pennsylvania
Legislature had sought to avoid).
123. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 78-94 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 68-94 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Campbell v. Board of Trustees, 495 N.E.2d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986). An important factor in the court's decision was the absence of evidence suggesting that
the college had provided the plaintiff with alcohol.
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duty to prevent the hazard from occurring."'
B. Social Host Liability for Violation of a Statute and as a Basis
for Claims Against Colleges and Universities
1. Preliminary Considerations.-Social host liability may be
predicated upon the violation of state statutes. 30 Generally, the stat-
utes upon which such liability is asserted are alcoholic beverage con-
trol acts. 13 1 Typically, these statutes make it unlawful to sell or fur-
nish intoxicating beverages to minors or obviously intoxicated
persons1"2 and a violation of the act generally results in a misde-
meanor offense. 83 As applied in the civil context, courts have con-
strued these statutes to create a minimum standard of care.'3  More
importantly, courts have held that the violation of these statutes is
evidence of negligence'35 or, in some instances, negligence per se.' 36
Because these acts exist in every state,'3 7 they are an important and
fertile source of social host liability.
A plaintiff's success in asserting social host liability based on
violation of a statute is dependent upon the court determining that
the act was designed: a) to protect a class of persons including the
plaintiff; b) to protect the interest of the plaintiff that has been in-
vaded; c) to protect against the particular type of harm that has
been inflicted; and d) to protect the plaintiff's interest against the
particular cause of that harm.' Applying this analysis, courts have
sought to further the underlying policies of these criminal statutes by
imposing civil liability upon those who would create an unacceptable
risk by serving minors and persons who are obviously intoxicated. 39
As with actions based on ordinary principles of negligence, there
has been a certain degree of judicial reluctance towards the recogni-
129. See supra notes 95-102, 109-17 and accompanying text.
130. Special Project, supra note 36, at 1076; Comment, supra note 37, at 1151.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Special Project, supra note 36, at 1076; Comment, supra note 37, at 1151-52
n.153.
134. Comment, supra note 37, at 1152.
135. Comment, supra note 37, at 1152 (citing Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App.
3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978)).
136. Comment, supra note 37, at 1152 (citing Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663,
309 N.E,2d 150 (1974)).
137. Special Project, supra note 36, at 1076, 1077.
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965); Comment, supra note 37, at
1152.
139. Special Project, supra note 36, at 1077; Comment, supra note 37, at 1152. See,
e.g., Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 667, -, 309 N.E.2d 150, 157 (1974) (stating that
the purpose of Indiana law, which is to protect citizenry from dangers imposed by intoxicated
minors, is furthered by imposition of civil liability).
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tion of claims against social hosts predicated upon violation of a stat-
ute.'40 Foremost among the reasons cited by courts which have re-
jected such claims are that the legislature did not intend to apply the
statutes to social hosts,"" and that the plaintiff was not a member of
the class which the statute was intended to protect.1
42
2. Decisions Bearing on College and University Liability: Vio-
lation of Statutes.-To date, no cases have been brought against a
college or university based upon violation of a statute. Nevertheless,
an institution of higher learning is generally subject to the same type
of liability as are individuals 43 and, therefore, analysis of decisions
based on such grounds is highly instructive.
In Bell v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity,"' the plaintiff, Rodney
Bell, sustained serious injuries when he fell from the roof of a frater-
nity house. Bell, who had been drinking for several hours prior to the
incident, was intoxicated at the time of his fall. 4" He and his par-
ents brought suit against the fraternity, the fraternity's building as-
sociation, and the university's interfraternity council. In asserting his
cause of action, Bell asked the court to hold that violation of a Ne-
vada statute, which made it illegal to "sell, give, or otherwise fur-
nish"' 46 an intoxicating beverage to a minor, was negligence per
se.
14 7
In addressing Bell's claim, the Nevada Supreme Court relied
upon its previous decision in Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc.
48
In Hamm, the court refused to impose civil liability based on viola-
tion of a statute that prohibited serving alcohol to a visibly intoxi-
cated person." 9 In view of its decision in Hamm, the court con-
cluded that the imposition of liability under the circumstances,
involved in Bell would be inconsistent with prior case law and legally
unsound.150 The court explained that "absent evidence of legislative
intent to impose civil liability, we shall not conclude that a violation
of a statute is negligence per se."'' The court therefore refused to
140. Special Project, supra note 36, at 1085.
141. See, e.g., Bell v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 98 Nev. 109, 642 P.2d 161 (1982).
142. Special Project, supra note 36, at 1085.
143. Roth, supra note 4, at 52.
144. 98 Nev. 109, 642 P.2d 161 (1982).
145. Id. at - , 642 P.2d at 162.
146. NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.055 (1969).
147. 98 Nev. at - , 642 P.2d at 162.
148. 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969).
149. Id.
150. 98 Nev. at - , 642 P.2d at 162.
151. Id. at - , 642 P.2d at 162.
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impose liability against any of the defendants.
A strikingly different result was achieved by the Third Circuit
in Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon."2 The court's decision in Fassett
addressed four separate lawsuits that arose from the same inci-
dent. 5 While returning from a fraternity sponsored party at which
approximately 200 minors were served alcohol, Anne Fassett,
Monica Buckley, and Corbin Evans were involved in a traffic acci-
dent."" It was alleged that Evans, the driver of the automobile, had
consumed alcohol at the party. 55 Monica Buckley was killed in the
accident and Anne Fassett was rendered a quadriplegic.' 56
The district court granted a series of summary judgments in
favor of the defendants.157 In granting the motions, the district court
reasoned that Pennsylvania would impose social host liability only
upon those individuals who had physically handed alcohol to
minors.1
58
On appeal, the Third Circuit engaged in an extensive examina-
tion of Pennsylvania case law. After reviewing three decisions of the
state's highest court, 59 the Third Circuit concluded that Pennsylva-
nia would permit intoxicated minors, and third parties injured by
them, to maintain a cause of action against those who had furnished
the alcohol.'6 0 The court then focused upon the scope of social host
liability in Pennsylvania. In attempting to determine the scope of lia-
bility, the court relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision
in Congini v. Portersville Valve Co.''1
In Congini, the court concluded that a social host who furnishes
alcohol to a minor may be held liable for injuries proximately result-
ing from the minor's inebriation. The court arrived at its conclusion
by an unusual analysis. Noting that under section 6308 of the Penn-
152. 807 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1986).
153. The cases were consolidated for trial. Id. at 1153.
154. Id. at 1152, 1153.
155. Id. at 1153 n.3.
156. There was no indication that Evans, who was a defendant in the action, sustained
any injury. Id.
157. 625 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
158. Id.
159. The three Pennsylvania cases examined by the Third Circuit were: Congini v.
Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983) (holding that service of alcohol to
minors constitutes negligence per se); Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507 (1983)
(refusing to recognize social host liability based on ordinary principles of negligence for serving
adult guests); Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973) (refusing to recognize a
cause of action against a social host based upon violation of Pennsylvania Liquor Code).
160. 807 F.2d at 1159.
161. 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983).
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sylvania Crimes Code, 162 it is unlawful for a minor to possess or con-
sume alcoholic beverages, the court gleaned a legislative intent to
protect minors and the public from the dangers of underage drink-
ing. 16 3 Therefore, the court held that violation of section 6308 consti-
tutes negligence per se in a civil action."" Moreover, the court noted
that one who aids a minor in the consumption of alcohol is in viola-
tion of Pennsylvania's accomplice liability statute. 65 By holding the
defendant liable in the Congini case, the court implicitly established
that the service of alcohol to a minor violates the accomplice liability
statute and constitutes negligence per se in a civil action. 66
Applying this analysis in the Fassett case, the Third Circuit
opined that any person who substantially assists a minor's consump-
tion of alcohol could be found civilly liable.1 67 In ascertaining what
constitutes "substantial" assistance, the court looked to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 876(b) which provides six factors designed
to assist in making this determination: 1) the nature of the act en-
couraged; 2) the amount of assistance given by the defendant; 3) the
defendant's presence or absence at the time of the tort; 4) the de-
fendant's relation to the other tortfeasors; 5) the defendant's state of
mind; and 6) the foreseeability of the harm that occurred. 168 Thus,
the court concluded that if the aid given to a minor's consumption is
substantial in light of these factors, the person or persons providing
such aid could be subject to liability as a social host. Moreover, by
162. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308 (Purdon 1983).
163. 504 Pa. at 162, 470 A.2d at 517, 518.
164. Id. at 162-63, 470 A.2d at 517-18 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
286 (1965)).
165. 504 Pa. at 161, 470 A.2d at 517 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306 (Purdon
1983)). The Pennsylvania accomplice liability statute provides:
(a) General rule.-A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his
own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally account-
able, or both.
(c) Accomplice defined.-A person is an accomplice of another person in
the commission of an offense if:
(I) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the
offense, he:
(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or
(ii) aids, agrees or attempts to aid such other person in plan-
ning or committing it; or
(2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his
complicity.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 306 (Purdon 1983).
166. In finding the social host negligent per se, the Congini court followed the analysis
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965). 504 Pa. at 162-63, 470 A.2d at
517, 518.
167. Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1162, 1163 (3d Cir. 1986).
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1965).
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rejecting the district court's conclusion that only those who physi-
cally serve intoxicating beverages to a minor are susceptible to liabil-
ity, the Third Circuit implicitly expanded the scope of social host
liability to new extremes.169
Subsequently, in Macleary v. Hines,17 0 the Third Circuit began
to define the types of acts that may constitute "substantial assis-
tance." In Macleary, the minor plaintiff was injured when the car in
which he was riding collided with a tree. The driver of the car, Den-
nis Hines, had been drinking at a party hosted by another minor,
Barbara Farrell.' Macleary had also been drinking at the party. 7'
The plaintiff brought suit against Farrell under the rule an-
nounced in Congini v. Portersville Valve Co. 7 3 In his first theory of
recovery, Macleary contended that his own impaired condition,
which caused him to accept a ride with a visibly intoxicated driver,
resulted from Farrell's negligence in aiding or encouraging the con-
sumption of alcohol by minors. In addressing this contention, the
court reasoned that the foreseeable risk which made the defendant's
alleged conduct negligent was that an intoxicated minor would con-
duct himself in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of
harm to himself or others. 74 Therefore, the court concluded that a
social host may be liable when a minor becomes intoxicated as a
guest and places himself in a position of unreasonable peril and is
injured by a third party.
7 5
The second theory upon which Macleary based his claim was
that Farrell had been negligent in facilitating the consumption of
alcohol by a minor. Farrell argued that there was no evidence show-
ing that Hines had consumed any alcohol which she had made avail-
able.' 76 The court rejected Farrell's argument and concluded that
"one who knowingly allows premises over which he has control to be
used for the purpose of consumption of alcohol by minors" may be
liable as a social host. 77 Significantly, the court explicitly declared
169. 807 F.2d at 1164.
170. 817 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1987).
171. The beer was purchased by a person other than Farrell. Farrell did, however, con-
tribute money toward the purchase price of the keg. Id. at 1082.
172. Id. Twice during the evening, Macleary and Hines left the party to buy six-packs
of beer at a nearby bar. The accident occurred while the two were returning from their second
trip to the bar. Id.
173. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
174. 817 F.2d at 1084.
175. Id. at 1081, 1084.
176. Id. at 1085. Several witnesses testified that they had seen Macleary drink from the
keg. Id. at 1082.
177. Id. at 1085. The court relied on § 877(c) of the Second Restatement of Torts in
reaching its conclusion. According to this provision, one is subject to liability for harm result-
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that a social host need not furnish the alcohol; rather, a host's delib-
erate creation of a "hospitable environment" may suffice as a sub-
stantial factor contributing toward the minor's consumption of
alcohol. 8
The Bell, Fassett, and Macleary decisions are demonstrative of
the diametrically opposed positions that courts have taken in decid-
ing whether social host liability may be predicated on the violation of
a state statute. The Bell decision provides a classic illustration of a
court's reluctance to extend the social host liability premised on this
theory. 7 9 The Fassett and Macleary decisions, however, exemplify
the broad scope of liability that may arise from the judicial recogni-
tion of statutory social host liability. 8" The extent of this liability is
particularly evident when analyzed in the context of higher
education.
Under the rules announced by the Third Circuit in Fassett and
Macleary, colleges and universities are in a perilous situation. In
Fassett, the court relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
876(b) to determine whether the assistance given by a host toward a
minor's consumption of alcohol was substantial.' 8' Applying the Fas-
set analysis to recent statistical data concerning college and univer-
sity alcohol policies leads to the inevitable conclusion that many in-
stitutions of higher learning are at risk.'82
a. The Nature of the Acts Encouraged.-A recent survey con-
ducted by the College Consortium on Drugs and Alcohol found that,
on average, more than three of four institutions in Pennsylvania per-
mit kegs on campus. 83 Furthermore, over one-fourth of all schools
permit beer to be sold on campus, with nearly one-fifth allowing con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages in campus dining areas. 84 Although
these statistics do not necessarily demonstrate active encouragement,
a jury might reasonably infer that administrations foster an environ-
ing from the tortious conduct of another if he "permits the other to act upon his premises...
knowing or having reason to know that the other is acting or will act tortiously." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) (1965).
178. 817 F.2d at 1085.
179. See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 153-78 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
182. For a brief treatment of this analysis, see Willig, After Fassett: When May Social
Host Liability Extend to Higher Education Institutions?, I SYMPOSIA 1 (1987).
183. The confidential Survey Analysis of Official Alcohol Policies from Pennsylvania
Higher Education Institutions, prepared by the College Consortium on Drugs and Alcohol, et.
al., May 1986, at 36 [hereinafter CCDA Survey] (copy of CCDA survey on file at Dickinson
Law Review office).
184. Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at 7.
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ment conducive to drinking by selling alcohol, designating acceptable
areas for student drinking, and permitting common containers, i.e.
kegs, on campus. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the
vast majority of college students are minors.
b. The Amount of Assistance Given.-Significantly, in spite of
concern for student drinking, more than one-third of all schools al-
low students to drink in university housing. '85 Moreover, three out of
every four schools in Pennsylvania permit university funds to be used
either for the purchase of alcoholic beverages that are consumed by
students or for sponsoring events at which alcohol is served.186 Aside
from actually delivering the alcohol to students, it is difficult to con-
ceive of a more significant amount of assistance than using school
funds to procure the alcohol or to sponsor events at which alcohol
will be available. Moreover, the use of school funds for the purchase
of alcohol would contradict the admonition of the Campbell decision,
in which the court refused to impose liability because of a lack of
evidence suggesting that the school had provided the alcohol.
c. The Defendant's Presence or Absence at the Time of the
Tort.-In Pennsylvania, eighty percent of all schools do not require
supervision of campus social events where alcohol is served. 18 7 By not
requiring supervision of such events, these schools, and those with
similar policies, are ignoring potentially hazardous situations and, in-
directly, may be encouraging underage consumption. Such omissions
are in direct contrast to the decisions in Campbell and Whitlock,
where the respective courts concluded that knowledge of underage
drinking creates an affirmative duty of care.1 88
d. The Defendant's State of Mind.-Nationwide, approxi-
mately one-half of all schools designate particular areas on campus
where students are permitted to consume alcoholic beverages. 89
Moreover, in some states, one of four schools acknowledge, as part of
their official alcohol policies, that they will not enforce the state's
law concerning drinking by minors. 190 The combination of these sta-
tistics conveys the impression that some schools actually condone un-
derage drinking among the student population.
185. Id.
186. CCDA Survey, supra note 183, at 69.
187. CCDA Survey, supra note 183, at 72.
188. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
189. Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at 7.
190. See, e.g., CCDA Survey, supra note 183, at 32.
SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY
e. The Foreseeability of the Harm.-College and university
administrators across the nation are by now well versed in the vari-
ous harms associated with the consumption of alcohol - whether by
a minor or otherwise. 191 This is demonstrated by the increasing num-
ber of schools that offer courses in alcohol and drug education, as
well as by the increasing number of schools reporting alcohol-related
problems among their students.
While the Fassett decision alone may have been cause for
alarm, the Macleary decision may reasonably be considered cause
for panic. Under Macleary, a school need only allow its premises to
be used for the consumption of alcohol by minors in order to expose
itself to liability.192 In view of the fact that roughly one-third of all
schools permit drinking in university housing,1 93 and that in some
states eighty percent of all schools do not enforce state liquor laws,19'
it seems quite likely that a jury could conclude that a school fitting
within these statistics is deliberately creating a hospitable environ-
ment for alcohol consumption by minors. This is particularly true in
light of the obvious awareness among administrations of the alcohol-
related accidents, crimes, injuries, and deaths which occur on
campus. 195
III. Social Host Liability on Campus: Is the Burden too Great?
Accepting for the moment that social host liability will find its
way onto college and university campuses, there remains the consid-
eration of whether such an extension of liability is desirable. The
critical inquiry appears to be whether the imposition of social host
liability on colleges and universities places an unjust burden on these
institutions.
In order to avoid social host liability, schools may consider
adopting the alcohol policy of the state in which they are located. As
the Bradshaw'96 and Beach19 decisions conclude, a college regula-
tion that tracks state law does not establish a custodial relationship
between the school and its students. Yet, as the Fassett'98 and
Macleary" decisions demonstrate, violation of a state statute can
191. See supra notes 13-34 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 172-80 and accompanying text.
193. Drinking Problem, supra note 3, at 7.
194. CCDA Survey, supra note 183, at 5.
195. See supra notes 13-34 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 68-88 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 152-69 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text.
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establish negligence per se. Therefore, it appears that a school would
have to strictly enforce the state statute. In view of the sheer number
of students that attend many undergraduate institutions, enforcing
such a policy may be an onerous burden.200 Moreover, strict enforce-
ment of such a policy would place students and administrators in an
adversarial relationship which, in turn, could have adverse conse-
quences on the educational process.20'
Another option may be the prohibition of alcohol on campus.
This suggestion, however, suffers from similar flaws. Completely
banning the consumption of alcohol on campus may imply that the
school has gone beyond state law and assumed a custodial relation-
ship.20 2 Failure to adequately enforce such a policy would seem to
re-open the possibility of successful claims based on the breach of a
duty arising from a special relationship.20 3
Perhaps most importantly, the imposition of social host liability
on institutions of higher learning may increase the cost of education,
thereby precluding otherwise qualified students from attaining a de-
gree. The cost of insurance to colleges and universities is already
prohibitive.2°0 The threat of social host liability would inevitably in-
crease these costs, forcing administrators to either raise tuition, or
cut some programs. 0 5 Each choice is inimical to the strong interest
that society has in making higher education available to as many
students as possible.20 6 In view of the conflicting considerations in-
volved, it appears that this matter would be most appropriately ad-
dressed by the state legislatures. At this point, however, no such ac-
tion has been taken.
IV. Interim Relief: Risk Management
Until state lawmaking bodies are willing to address the issue,
institutions of higher learning would be well advised to implement
programs which seek to limit the potential for liability. A mul-
tifaceted and comprehensive prevention program, designed to reduce
high risk drinking patterns and to prepare university personnel in
200. See Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 419 (Utah 1986).
201. 726 P.2d at 419. See Baldwin v. Zoradi, 123 Cal. App. 3d 275, 290, - P.2d
. - . 176 Cal. Rptr. 809, 818 (1981); Jones, supra note 58, at 995-99.
202. See W. KAPLAN, supra note 4, at 60.
203. Id.
204. Jones, supra note 58, at 999.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Lister v. Hoover, 706 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that although
there is no fundamental right to a higher education, a state's interest in having its high school
graduates obtain a college education is significant).
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terms of addressing problems that do arise, can be an important in-
strument in reducing liability costs associated with alcohol consump-
tion by students.207 Appropriate measures may well affect the out-
come of liability suits.2 08
First and foremost, institutions which serve alcohol as commer-
cial purveyors, or which allow resident staff to serve alcohol at no
cost as part of campus social functions, must consider abolishing
such practices.2 0 9 Alternatively, schools should develop detailed in-
structions for all employees or staff members who sell, serve, or dis-
pense alcoholic beverages to insure compliance with the law. 210
Additionally, schools may wish to consider banning alcohol pro-
motion on campus. Among the measures which should be considered
are eliminating alcohol promotions on campus grounds, eliminating
campus activities of representatives of alcohol manufacturers, and
refusing entertainment events sponsored by alcohol
manufacturers.211
Another approach is to ban alcohol from high risk settings. 12
Such settings may include athletic events and fraternity pledge
parties.213
Finally, schools should consider prohibiting the use of student
fees or funds for the purchase of alcohol for student events. 214 Ulti-
mately, schools should adopt any measures that encourage safer
practices at events where alcohol is consumed.
V. Conclusion
Colleges and universities are at an ever-increasing risk of being
held liable as social hosts. While the university is no longer an in-
surer of its students, recent decisions have narrowed the line that
distinguishes liability from non-liability. Moreover, the expansion in
some jurisdictions of social host liability based on violation of state
statutes strongly suggests that schools need to take affirmative action
207. Roth, supra note 4, at 57. See Buchanan, supra note 2, at 16-18; Gregory, supra
note 10, at 52, 53; Janosik, supra note 4, at 24; Ingalls, The Steps Colleges and Universities
Should Take in Developing Policies on Alcohol Consumption, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar.
27, 1985, at II.
208. Roth, supra note 4, at 58. See Janosik, supra note 4, at 24.
209. See Buchanan, supra note 2, at 17; Gregory, supra note 10, at 52; Janosik, supra
note 4, at 24; Roth, supra note 4, at 61.
210. Buchanan, supra note 2, at 17; Gregory, supra note 10, at 52; Janosik, supra note
4, at 24; Roth, supra note 4, at 61.
211. Roth, supra note 4, at 58-60.
212. Roth, supra note 4, at 61, 62.
213. Id.
214. See Gregory, supra note 10, at 52; Roth, supra note 4, at 62.
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toward eliminating risks.
The expanding scope of social host liability, particularly in the
context of higher education, necessitates legislative action. Conflict-
ing policy considerations indicate that thorough evaluation of poten-
tial ramifications is in order. In the interim, schools would be well-
advised to adopt any policy that reduces their risk of alcohol-related
liability. Otherwise, schools may be only one beer away from million
dollar judgments.
George L. Stewart H
